

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

United States of America,  
 Plaintiff  
 v.  
 Ramon Desage, et al.,  
 Defendants

**2:13-cr-00039-JAD-VCF**

**Order Sustaining the Government's  
 Objections and Reversing in Part and  
 Remanding the Magistrate Judge's  
 Order**

[ECF Nos. 127, 128, 129, 182, 183]

Ramon Desage stands charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States (1 count), wire fraud (18 counts), money laundering (27 counts), and income tax evasion (4 counts), all stemming from Desage's alleged investment-fraud scheme and related tax fraud.<sup>1</sup> In August 2015, the magistrate judge granted Desage's motion to compel production of ten years' worth of tax records for 14 individuals and entities.<sup>2</sup> The government objects.<sup>3</sup> Because most of the requested tax records are not in the government's possession, this court lacks authority to compel their production under Rule 16 or *Brady/Giglio*. As to the few records in the government's possession, their disclosure under Rule 16 is prohibited by 26 USC § 6103, which broadly protects taxpayer information. I therefore sustain the government's objections and remand to the magistrate judge to determine whether the Hefetz/Frey returns are, in whole or in part, discoverable under *Brady*.

**Background**

**A. Desage moved to compel tax records**

In his four-page motion to compel, Desage requested the 2005–2014 tax returns for: (1) Jacob (Yakov) Hefetz; (2) any entity with which Hefetz is or was affiliated with that is alleged to have loaned funds to or invested funds with Desage or any entity with which Desage is affiliated; (3)

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<sup>1</sup> ECF No. 59.

<sup>2</sup> ECF No. 107.

<sup>3</sup> ECF No. 182.

1 Harold Foonberg; (4) Stanley Sunkin; (5) any entity with which Foonberg is or was affiliated with  
2 that is alleged to have loaned funds to or invested funds with Desage or any entity with which  
3 Desage is affiliated; (6) Harvey Vechery; (7) Linda Vechery; (8) any entity with which H. Vechery is  
4 or was affiliated with that is alleged to have loaned funds to or invested funds with Desage or any  
5 entity with which Desage is affiliated; (9) William Richardson; (10) any entity with which William  
6 Richardson is or was affiliated that is alleged to have loaned funds to or invested funds with Desage  
7 or any entity with which Desage is affiliated; (11) Herb Frey; (12) AW Financial Group; (13) Federal  
8 Pants Company, Inc; and (14) F & S Partners LP. Of these individuals and entities, only Hefetz,  
9 Harvey Vechery, Foonberg, and Richardson are alleged victims in this case. This is the sole basis  
10 Desage proffered for his broad request:

11 Mr. Desage expects that Mr. Richardson's, Mr. Vechery's and Mr. Foonberg's  
12 personal and corporate tax returns will show that they did not take into account their  
13 receipts of cash from Mr. Desage. These omissions from their tax returns will  
14 constitute significant impeachment material regarding the credibility of these alleged  
victims. Thus, the tax returns are crucial to Mr. Desage's defense that he did not  
defraud investors/lenders.<sup>4</sup>

15 The government opposed the request, arguing that Desage failed to make the threshold  
16 showing that the returns are material, disclosure is prohibited under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and the  
17 prosecution team is not in possession of the requested returns.<sup>5</sup> If the magistrate judge granted the  
18 motion, the government requested that the records be first examined by the court in camera to  
19 determine if any *Brady/Giglio* material is present before disclosure to defense counsel. The  
20 government also requested a protective order limiting Desage's use of the tax information.

21 **B. The magistrate judge granted Desage's motion**

22 After reciting the standards for disclosure under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and  
23 *Brady/Giglio*, the magistrate judge granted Desage's motion. The full explanation for the ruling is:

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27 <sup>4</sup> ECF No. 107 at 3.

28 <sup>5</sup> ECF No. 114.

1 Mr. Desage is not engaged in a fishing expedition. His motion  
2 requests specific tax records for specific years for specific victims.  
3 Nor has Mr. Desage failed to make a plausible showing that the tax  
4 records are favorable to his defense. He contends that the records will  
5 show that the victims failed to report earned income, which they  
received in cash from Mr. Desage. This plausibly shows that the tax  
records contain impeachment evidence. [FN. 1 The government  
concedes that it possesses the tax records Mr. Desage seeks].<sup>6</sup>

6 **C. The government objected**

7 The government objected to the magistrate judge's order, arguing that there were three errors  
8 warranting reversal: the magistrate judge incorrectly held that Desage made the requisite materiality  
9 showing under Rule 16 and *Brady/Giglio*, the magistrate judge accepted Desage's faulty and  
10 unsupported argument that the returns would constitute impeachment material, and the order is  
11 significantly overbroad.<sup>7</sup> One of the alleged victims whose records were ordered disclosed, William  
12 Richardson, filed a motion for relief under the Crime Victim Rights Act<sup>8</sup> and joined in the  
13 government's objections.<sup>9</sup>

14 The parties stipulated to multiple continuances of the deadline for Desage's response to the  
15 government's objections, ultimately extending the deadline for almost one year. Shortly before the  
16 government's response was due in August 2016, the government—now represented by two new U.S.  
17 Attorneys—moved for leave to file supplemental briefing in support of its objections to address 28  
18 U.S.C. § 6103.<sup>10</sup> I found that additional briefing on § 6103's interaction with Rule 16 and  
19 *Brady/Giglio* would be helpful and that the delay would not be prejudicial to Desage, who had still  
20 not filed his response to the government's initial objections.<sup>11</sup> I therefore gave the government seven  
21 days to file a new, complete appeal of the magistrate judge's order and ordered both of the parties to

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22 <sup>6</sup> ECF No. 121 at 4.

23 <sup>7</sup> ECF No. 127.

24 <sup>8</sup> ECF No. 128.

25 <sup>9</sup> ECF No. 129.

26 <sup>10</sup> ECF No. 174.

27 <sup>11</sup> ECF No. 177.

1 address the applicability of § 6103 to the magistrate judge's order and to the production of the tax  
2 records requested in this case.

3 **D. Supplemental briefing**

4 The government's newly filed objections flesh out its § 6103-based arguments and its  
5 arguments that Desage failed to make the required materiality showing far beyond the thin discussion  
6 originally provided to the magistrate judge.<sup>12</sup> The government comprehensively argues that, under  
7 the plain language of § 6103 and its interpretive jurisprudence, this court lacks the power to compel  
8 production of taxpayer return information unless the United States Attorney already possesses the  
9 taxpayer information under one of two narrow exceptions that are not applicable here. The  
10 government maintains that it cannot be required to produce—under Rule 16 or  
11 *Brady/Giglio*—information that is not in its actual or constructive possession and clarifies that, with  
12 the exception of the tax returns of two of the victims, it does not possess the requested documents.  
13 Finally, the government contends that the tax-return information is not material to this case and  
14 therefore not subject to disclosure, and that the magistrate judge's order is erroneous and overbroad  
15 because he failed to individually assess the requested records. Richardson joins in the government's  
16 objections.<sup>13</sup>

17 Desage maintains that the tax returns “will yield crucial impeachment evidence” and are thus  
18 discoverable under Rule 16 and *Brady/Giglio* and that the magistrate judge's order is not overbroad.  
19 In response to the government's § 6103-based arguments, Desage contends that there is nothing in  
20 the statute that prohibits the court from ordering the government to obtain taxpayer information that  
21 is not already in its possession and that falls within § 6103(h)(2) and (4) subsection (B)–(C)'s  
22 exceptions for release of taxpayer information. Desage also questions the government's assertion  
23 that, with the exception of the records of two of the victims, it is not in possession of the requested  
24 tax records. The rest of Desage's response opposes Richardson's motion for relief under the Crime  
25 Victim Rights Act.

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27 <sup>12</sup> Compare ECF No. 182, with ECF No. 114.

28 <sup>13</sup> ECF No. 183.

## Discussion

### A. Standard of review

A district judge may “reconsider any pretrial matter . . . where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”<sup>14</sup> The district judge may affirm, reverse, or modify the magistrate judge’s order and may also remand the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.<sup>15</sup> A magistrate judge’s order is “clearly erroneous” if the court has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”<sup>16</sup> “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.”<sup>17</sup>

I find that the order is clearly erroneous because it is premised on the misperception that the government possesses *all* of the requested tax records despite the government’s representation that it did not, in fact, have the records. The order is also clearly erroneous because it failed to individually address the 14 different categories of requested tax returns. Because I find that the order is clearly erroneous, I reconsider Desage’s motion to compel, reverse in part the magistrate judge’s order granting it, and remand for further findings on whether the few returns in the government’s possession are discoverable under *Brady*.

### B. 26 U.S.C. § 6103

Desage’s request for income-tax returns submitted to the IRS is a request for “taxpayer return information,” which is presumptively confidential under 26 U.S.C. § 6103 unless one of the statute’s narrow exceptions applies. Desage points to § 6103(h)(2) and (4) as the basis for his request. Section 6103(h) provides for disclosure to certain federal officers and employees for matters involving tax administration. Subsection (h)(2) and (4) provide that return information may be “open to inspection by or disclosure to” United States Attorneys and disclosed in federal judicial proceedings pertaining to tax administration if “(B) the treatment of an item reflected on such return

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<sup>14</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

<sup>15</sup> L.R. IB 3-1(b).

<sup>16</sup> *United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).

<sup>17</sup> *Jadwin v. Cty of Kern*, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1110–11 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

1 is or may be related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding or investigation; or (C) such return  
 2 information relates or may relate to a transactional relationship between a person who is or may be a  
 3 party to the proceeding and the taxpayer which affects, or may affect, the resolution of an issue in  
 4 such proceeding or investigation.” The statute also sets forth the procedures through which the  
 5 United States Attorney can apply for disclosure of protected information that fits one of these  
 6 exceptions.

7  
 8 **C. Besides the Hefetz/Frey returns, the government is not in possession of any of the  
 requested documents, so they are not discoverable under Rule 16 or *Brady*.**

9 The magistrate judge’s order does not address § 6103; it examines only whether Rule 16 and  
 10 *Brady* allow for disclosure of the requested taxpayer information.<sup>18</sup> Disclosure under either Rule 16  
 11 or *Brady* requires that the requested materials be within the possession, custody, or control of the  
 12 prosecution or those acting on its behalf.<sup>19</sup> The government represents that, besides the returns for  
 13 Jacob Hefetz and Herb Frey, it is not in possession of any of the requested returns.<sup>20</sup> Desage  
 14 responds that the government must possess all of the requested records because it has openly  
 15 admitted that IRS agents are involved in this case.

16 The government represents that only the criminal investigative arm of the IRS has been  
 17 involved with this case and that the civil division of the IRS—which is likely in possession of the  
 18 requested documents—has never been a part of this case.<sup>21</sup> This is a crucial distinction between this  
 19 case and the case Desage cites, *United States v. Prokop*. In *Prokop*, District Judge Du upheld the  
 20 magistrate judge’s finding that the government possessed audit files based on the government’s own  
 21 representations that both the criminal and civil investigation divisions of the IRS had participated in  
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23 <sup>18</sup> This is likely because the government only briefly mentioned § 6103 in its response to Desage’s  
 24 motion to compel, but its new objections focus extensively on the statute.

25 <sup>19</sup> FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 16(a)(1)(E); *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1996) (“the individual  
 26 prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s  
 behalf in [the particular case], including police.”).

27 <sup>20</sup> ECF No. 182 at 25–26.

28 <sup>21</sup> ECF No. 205 at 8–9.

1 the case and that the IRS was prepared to provide the audits upon appropriate order by the court.<sup>22</sup>  
2 After finding that the requested documents were in the government's possession and material to the  
3 defense, Judge Du concluded that the additional requirements for disclosure under 26 U.S.C. §  
4 6103(h) were met and that the audit records were therefore discoverable. But the bulk of the tax  
5 records requested here are not in the government's possession, so they are not discoverable under  
6 Rule 16 or *Brady* even if they fit under one of § 6103's disclosure exceptions.

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8 **D. Tax-return information is discoverable under Rule 16 only if it meets the disclosure requirements of § 6103.**

9 Desage argues that disclosure of the tax returns is authorized by § 6103(h)(2), which sets out  
10 when tax-return information may be disclosed to the Department of Justice and (h)(4), which  
11 governs the disclosure of tax-return information in judicial proceedings and administrative tax  
12 proceedings.<sup>23</sup> I am persuaded by the authority the government cites, particularly *United States v.*  
13 *Robertson*, that a court may not order the release of tax-return information under § 6103(h) that has  
14 not already been produced to the government through the application process described in § 6103(h)  
15 or (i)(1).<sup>24</sup> I agree that the disclosure process described in § 6103(h)(2) and (4) presupposes that the  
16 prosecuting United States Attorney is already in possession of the tax returns and only then do (h)(2)  
17 and (h)(4) subsections (B) and (C) allow for disclosure and permit discovery under Rule 16, which  
18 cannot be used to circumvent § 6103's express statutory requirements.

19 The government represents that it is "not in possession of any [of] the requested tax returns  
20 pursuant to § 6103(h)" and that the United States Attorney "has never moved pursuant to 6103(i)(1)  
21 for an order releasing any of the taxpayer information Desage seeks."<sup>25</sup> The government explains  
22 that, although it is in constructive possession of the Hefetz/Frey returns for *Brady* purposes, it is not

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23 <sup>22</sup> *United States v. Prokop*, 2012 WL 2375001, \*2 (D. Nev. June 22, 2012).

24 <sup>23</sup> ECF No. 204 at 13.

25 <sup>24</sup> *United States v. Robertson*, 634 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Ca. 1986), *aff'd*, 815 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 912 (1987); *see also United States v. Recognition Equip., Inc.*, 720 F. Supp. 13 (D. D.C. 1989); *United States v. Jackson*, 850 F. Supp. 1481, 1490 (D. Kan. 1994).

26 <sup>25</sup> ECF No. 182 at 23.

1 in possession of these documents under § 6103 because it never made a proper application for them  
2 under the statute. The government further explains that the undersigned AUSA “recently  
3 investigated this issue, and after careful and specific discussion with the IRS criminal investigation  
4 division case agent, was able to confirm that the case agent, at one point very early in the  
5 investigation, pulled and reviewed the IRS Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) portfolios for  
6 Jacob Hefetz and Herb Frey, which contain” the requested tax returns for these individuals.<sup>26</sup> I agree  
7 that § 6103 does not permit disclosure under Rule 16 by the United States Attorney under these  
8 circumstances.

9 I also decline Desage’s invitation to issue an order requiring the government to apply for  
10 disclosure of the tax returns under § 6103(h) so that Desage can then obtain the records via Rule  
11 16.<sup>27</sup> As the government notes, none of the cases declining to order the government to disclose  
12 taxpayer information not already in its possession through § 6103’s application procedures suggest  
13 that this option is available. Indeed, the *Robertson* court expressly “refuse[d] to consider ordering  
14 either the Secretary of Treasury or the Attorney General to take disclosure action prescribed by  
15 subsection (h)(3) as such order would violate the separation of powers between the judicial and  
16 executive branches.”<sup>28</sup> I agree with the government that “the statute’s language and the separation of  
17 powers do not sanction the end-run around the statute that Desage proposes.”<sup>29</sup>

18 **E. *Brady* materials are discoverable even if they do not satisfy the disclosure requirements**  
19 **of § 6103.**

20 The final question—and one not addressed by the *Robertson* court that dealt with a request  
21 for production under Rule 16 only—is whether tax returns that satisfy *Brady* are discoverable even if  
22 their disclosure is prohibited by § 6103. The *Robertson* court noted that “[a] different problem  
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24 <sup>26</sup> ECF No. 182 at 26.

25 <sup>27</sup> ECF No. 204 at 16.

26 <sup>28</sup> *Robertson*, 634 F. Supp. at n.9 (citing *United States v. Gatto*, 763 F.2d 1040, 1096 (1985)  
27 (separation of powers limits court’s power of supervision over criminal discovery).

28 <sup>29</sup> ECF No. 205 at 7.

1 would arise if *Brady* material were involved” reasoning that, because *Brady* announced a  
2 constitutional principle, “a conflict between production of *Brady* material and statutory restrictions  
3 on disclosure of return information would have to be resolved in favor of production.”<sup>30</sup> I find that,  
4 because *Brady* is a constitutional rule, its disclosure requirement trumps § 6103’s disclosure  
5 limitations.<sup>31</sup> Though the government represents that it has never applied for and obtained these  
6 records via the procedures outlined in § 6103, it admits that it is deemed to be in possession of these  
7 documents for *Brady* purposes. Because the government concedes that it possesses the Hefetz/Frey  
8 returns for *Brady* purposes, these items are discoverable despite § 6103’s disclosure limitations *if*  
9 Desage can make the required materiality showing. Because the magistrate judge did not make  
10 individualized findings on these Hefetz/Frey returns, I am unable to determine whether they are  
11 discoverable under *Brady*. I therefore remand this matter back to the magistrate judge to determine  
12 whether any portion of the Hefetz/Frey returns is discoverable under *Brady*.

13 **F. Other pending motions [ECF Nos. 128, 129, 183]**

14 Because I hold in this order that production of alleged victim William Richardson’s tax  
15 returns is no longer required, I deny as moot his motion for relief under the Crime Victim Rights Act  
16 and his motions to join the government’s objections.

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25 <sup>30</sup> *Robertson*, 634 F. Supp. at n.10.

26 <sup>31</sup> *See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (*Brady* duty on prosecution trumped state  
27 statute preventing disclosure of child-abuse files); *see also Jackson*, 850 F. Supp. 1503–04 (noting  
28 that *Brady* “comes ahead of most statutory limitations on disclosure” but declining to compel  
production under § 6103 because documents were not in prosecution team’s possession).

**Conclusion**

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the government's objections [ECF No. 182] are SUSTAINED, and the magistrate judge's order [ECF No. 121] is REVERSED in part and remanded for determination of whether any portion of the Hefetz/Frey returns are discoverable under *Brady*.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the government's objections [ECF No. 127], Richardson's motion for relief under the Crime Victim Rights Act [ECF No. 128], and motions for joinder [ECF Nos. 129, 183] are DENIED as moot.

Dated this 9th day of January, 2017.

  
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Jennifer A. Dorsey  
United States District Judge